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The public pension system is the single largest item in Germany’s social
budget. In 2000, public pension expenditures amounted to some 200 bil-
lion euro, representing 21 percent of public spending and 11.8 percent of
gross domestic product (GDP). It is the second largest pension budget in
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
surpassed only by Italy (14.2 percent of GDP). It is more than 2.5 times as
expensive as the U.S. Social Security system (4.4 percent of GDP; OECD
2001). This paper argues that this large pension budget can be signiﬁcantly
reduced by neutralizing the strong incentives in the German pension sys-
tem to retire early.
The generosity of the German public pension system is considered a
great social achievement and has been a model for many social security sys-
tems around the world. It has been successful in providing a reliable level
of retirement income over the past 100 years. It is considered one of the pil-
lars of societal stability in Germany. It has survived, albeit under severe
modiﬁcations, through World Wars I and II, the Great Depression, and,
most recently, the German uniﬁcation.
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while this paper was produced.The aging of Germany’s population, however, is threatening the very
core of its pension system. All industrialized countries are aging, but Ger-
many, together with Italy and Japan, will experience a particularly dra-
matic change in the demographic structure of its population. The severity
of the demographic transition has two causes: a quicker increase in life
expectancy than elsewhere, partly due to a relatively low level still in the
1970s, and a more incisive baby boom/baby bust transition (e.g., relative to
the United States) to a very low fertility rate of 1.3 children per woman,
only a bit higher than the rock-bottom fertility rate of 1.2 in Italy and
Spain. Consequently, the ratio of elderly to working-age persons—the old-
age dependency ratio—will increase steeply. According to the latest
OECD projections, the proportion of elderly (aged 65 and above) will ex-
ceed a quarter of the population in 2030, and the German old-age depend-
ency ratio will almost double, from 24.0 percent in 2000 to 43.3 percent in
2030.1
The increase in the dependency ratio has immediate consequences for a
pay-as-you-go social insurance system because fewer workers must ﬁnance
the beneﬁts of more recipients. The German social security contribution
rate, in 2003 at 19.5 percent of gross income, was projected in the mid-
1990s to exceed 30 percent of gross income at the peak of population age-
ing in 2035 if the accustomed replacement rates were maintained.2This led
to major pension reforms in 1999 (a failed ﬁrst attempt) and 2001 (now
successful). This reform bade farewell to the pure pay-as-you-go system
and introduced a multipillar pension system with a small, but in the eyes of
many Germans, revolutionary funded pillar.
The reform did not, however, touch the early and normal retirement age,
which are age 60 and 65. This may come as a surprise, since in the light of
a prolonged life span, increasing its active part appears to be a rather nat-
ural reform option. This option is particularly attractive as increasing the
retirement age simultaneously increases the number of contributors and
decreases the number of beneﬁciaries. Moreover, Germans retire quite
early. Average retirement age is about 59.5 years, half a year younger than
the earliest eligibility age for old-age pensions and more than ﬁve years
younger than the so-called “normal” retirement age in Germany.3 Hence,
a substantial increase in the retirement age seems to be a reasonable policy
option, particularly because age-speciﬁc morbidity rates appear to have
shifted in line with mortality (Cutler and Sheiner 1998).
The politics of shifting the retirement age, however, are not favorable.
According to survey results by Boeri, Börsch-Supan, and Tabellini (2001,
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1. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 2001. The OECD
dependency ratio relates persons age 65 and older to persons between ages 15 and 64.
2. See Börsch-Supan (1998, 2000c) and Schnabel (1998) for descriptions of the problems,
and Birg and Börsch-Supan (1999) and Börsch-Supan (2002) for concrete reform proposals.
3. See Börsch-Supan and Schnabel (1998).2002, and 2005), raising the retirement age is one of the most unpopular
pension reform options in Germany (see ﬁgure 5.1). An interesting result
of this survey, however, is that this option is particularly unpopular among
those who are least informed about the costs of the current pension system.
Hence, while early retirement is a well-appreciated social achievement
among Germans, awareness of the costs of early retirement may moderate
the opposition to increasing the retirement age. A rough back-of-the-
envelope calculation may make the point. Since life expectancy at age 60 is
about eighteen years, each year of early retirement corresponds to about
5.5 percent of pension expenditures. Hence, making the normal retirement
age also the mean retirement age would cut pension expenditures by about
28 percent and would reduce the government projection of the contribu-
tion rate in 2020 from 22 percent to below 16 percent.
This chapter’s aim is to produce a more sophisticated estimate of the
budget eﬀects of an increase in the retirement age. This is the third stage of
an international research project on the causes for, and the eﬀects of, early
retirement. In the ﬁrst stage (Gruber and Wise 1999), we described and
quantiﬁed the incentives to retire early in the form of implicit taxes on con-
tinued work.
The second stage (Gruber and Wise 2003) provided econometric esti-
mates of the strength of incentive eﬀects on old-age labor supply, using sev-
eral speciﬁcations of incentive variables. These highly signiﬁcant and large
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Fig. 5.1 Popularity of pension reform optionsestimates were used to simulate labor force participation responses to sev-
eral policy changes. For instance, introducing (almost) actuarially fair ad-
justments (6 percent per year of delay) would increase the average retire-
ment age of German men by about three years and two months. The eﬀects
are about half that size for women.
This third stage uses these estimates and converts them into budget
eﬀects on the German public pension system. We simulate the impact of
several stylized reform plans on older workers’ net ﬁscal contributions to
the ﬁnances of the German public pension system. Such reform plans will
have two eﬀects on the budget of the pension system: ﬁrst, a direct eﬀect,
by changing contributions and beneﬁts for a given work history (we refer
to this eﬀect as the mechanical eﬀect) and, second, an indirect eﬀect
through labor supply responses to the reform (the behavioraleﬀect). We es-
timate the ﬁscal implications of both the mechanical and the behavioral
eﬀect, using the econometric retirement models from the second stage to
predict labor supply responses. The result will be an estimate of the steady-
state impact of the reforms on the ﬁnancial balance sheet of the German
public pension system.
More precisely, using a cohort of preretirement-age workers, we ﬁrst es-
timate the probability that each worker will exit the labor force via death
or retirement at each future age and the net present discounted value
(PDV) of retirement program contributions and beneﬁts associated with
each type of labor force exit. The resulting weighted average social security
wealth (SSW) will be the base for comparison. We will then reestimate the
exit probabilities, contributions, and beneﬁts under several reforms to ob-
tain new social security wealth estimates. The key numbers will be the per-
centage changes in social security wealth, including and excluding a be-
havioral response to the reform. The diﬀerence between these numbers
measures the extent to which labor supply responses amplify the eﬀect of
reforms on program solvency.
The paper is structured as follows: sections 5.2 and 5.3 describe the in-
stitutional background for private sector and civil servants’pensions.4Sec-
tion 5.4 presents data and variable speciﬁcations, section 5.5 contains our
simulation results, and section 5.6 concludes.
5.2 Private Sector Pensions
In this section we describe the German public retirement insurance
(Gesetzliche Rentenversicherung; GRV), which covers about 85 percent of
the German workforce. Most of these are private sector workers, but the
GRV also includes those public sector workers who are not civil servants.
Civil servants, about 7 percent of the workforce, have their own pension
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4. These sections are updated versions of Börsch-Supan et al. (2002).system, described in section 5.3. The self-employed, about 9 percent of the
work force, are mainly self-insured, although some also participate in the
public retirement insurance system. For the average German worker, oc-
cupational pensions do not play a major role in providing old-age income.
Neither do individual retirement accounts, but there are important excep-
tions from this general picture. Broadly speaking, the German system is
monolithic.
The following descriptions focus on the institutional rules that applied
during the period 1984–97, because this is the sample period of the under-
lying econometric estimates (dubbed “1972 legislation,” although there
have been several administrative adjustments since). There have been two
major pension reforms, in 1992 and 2001. They had, however, only negli-
gible eﬀects on the persons in the estimation sample, since generous grand-
fathering schemes applied. The last subsection brieﬂy sketches the impli-
cations of the two major reforms.
5.2.1 Coverage and Contributions
The German pay-as-you-go public pension system features a very broad
mandatory coverage of workers. Only the self-employed and, until 1998,
workers with earnings below the oﬃcial minimum earnings threshold (i.e.,
Geringfügigkeitsgrenze, 15 percent of average monthly gross wage; below
this threshold are about 5.6 percent of all workers) are not subject to
mandatory coverage.
Roughly 70 percent of the budget of the German public retirement in-
surance is ﬁnanced by contributions that are administered like a payroll
tax, levied equally on employees and employers. Total contributions in
2000 were 19.3 percent of the ﬁrst DM8,600 of monthly gross income (up-
per earnings threshold, Beitragsbemessungsgrenze, about 180 percent of
average monthly gross wage).5 Technically, contributions are split evenly
between employees and employers. While the contribution rate has been
fairly stable since 1970, the upper earnings threshold has been used as a ﬁ-
nancing instrument. It is anchored to the average wage and has increased
considerably faster than inﬂation.
Private sector pension beneﬁts are essentially tax free. Pension beneﬁci-
aries do not pay contributions to the pension system and/or to unemploy-
ment insurance. However, pensioners have to pay the equivalent of the em-
ployees’ contribution to the mandatory medical insurance. The equivalent
of the employers’ contribution to health insurance is paid by the pension
system.
The remaining approximately 30 percent of the social security budget is
ﬁnanced by earmarked indirect taxes (a ﬁxed fraction of the value-added
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5. West Germany only, DM 7,200 in East Germany (one DM has a purchasing power of
approximately $0.50).tax and the new eco-tax on fossil fuel) and a subsidy from the federal gov-
ernment. The subsidy is also used to ﬁne tune the pay-as-you-go budget
constraint, which has a minimal reserve of one month worth of beneﬁts.
5.2.2 Beneﬁt Types
The German public retirement insurance provides old-age pensions for
workers aged 60 and older, disability beneﬁts for workers below age 60,
which are converted to old-age pensions latest at age 65, and survivor ben-
eﬁts for spouses and children. In addition, preretirement (i.e., retirement
before age 60) is possible through several mechanisms, using the public
transfer system, mainly unemployment compensation. We begin by de-
scribing old-age pensions.
5.2.3 Eligibility for Beneﬁts and Retirement Age for Old-Age Pensions
Eligibility for beneﬁts and the minimum retirement age depend on which
type of pension the worker chooses. The German public retirement insur-
ance distinguishes ﬁve types of old-age pensions, corresponding to normal
retirement and four types of early retirement (see table 5.1).
This complex system was introduced by the 1972 social security reform.
One of the key provisions was the introduction of ﬂexible retirement after
age 63, with full beneﬁts for workers with a long service history. In addi-
tion, retirement at age 60 with full beneﬁts is possible for women, the un-
employed, and older disabled workers. “Older disabled workers” refers to
those workers who cannot be appropriately employed for health or labor
market reasons and are age 60 or older. There are three ways to claim old-
age disability beneﬁts. One has to (1) be at least 50 percent physically dis-
abled, (2) pass a strict earnings test, or (3) pass a much weaker earnings
test. The strict earnings test is passed if the earnings capacity is reduced be-
low the minimum earnings threshold for any reasonableoccupation (about
15 percent of average gross wage; erwerbsunfähig; EU). The weaker earn-
ings test is passed when no vacancies for the worker’s speciﬁc job descrip-
tion are available and the worker has to face an earnings loss of at least 50
percent when changing to a diﬀerent job (berufsunfähig; BU). As opposed
to the disability insurance for workers below age 60 (see the following), full
beneﬁts are paid in all three cases.
Figure 5.2 shows the uptake of the various pathways,6 including the dis-
ability pathway described subsequently, (adding to 100 percent on the ver-
tical axis) and their changes over time (marked on the horizontal axis),
mostly in response to reforms, beneﬁt adjustments, and administrative rule
changes, in particularly the tightening of the disability screening process.
This ﬁgure shows the multitude of possible pathways. A major undertak-
ing of this chapter is to take account of this diversity.
Through the 1992 social security reform and its subsequent modiﬁca-
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6. See Jacobs, Kohli, and Rein (1990) for this concept.tions, the age limits of the various types of early retirement will gradually
be raised to age 65. These changes will be fully phased in by the year 2004.
The only distinguishing feature of types B and C of early retirement will
then be the possibility to retire up to ﬁve years earlier than age 65 if a suﬃ-
cient number of service years (currently thirty-ﬁve years) has been accu-
mulated. As opposed to the pre-1992 regulations, beneﬁts will be adjusted
to a retirement age below age 65 in a manner that will be described later.
5.2.4 Beneﬁts
Beneﬁts are strictly work related. The German system does not have
beneﬁts for spouses, as in the United States.7 Beneﬁts are computed on a
lifetime basis and are adjusted according to the type of pension and retire-
ment age. They are the product of four elements: (1) the employee’s relative
earnings position, (2) the years of service life, (3) adjustment factors for
pension type and (since the 1992 reform) retirement age, and (4) the aver-
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Table 5.1 Old-Age pensions (1972 legislation)
Retirement Years of Earnings
Pension type age service Additional conditions test
A Normal 65 5 No
B Long service life  63 35 Yes
(“ﬂexible”)
C Women 60 15 10 years of those after age 40 Yes
D Older disabled 60 35 Loss of at least 50% earnings capability Yes
E Unemployed 60 15 1.5 to 3 years of unemployment (has Yes
changed several times)
Note: This legislation was changed in the reform of 1992. It has been eﬀective until the year 1998.
7. There are, of course, survivor beneﬁts.
Fig. 5.2 Pathways to retirement (males), 1960–95age pension. The ﬁrst three factors make up the personal pension base,
while the fourth factor determines the income distribution between work-
ers and pensioners in general.
The employee’s relative contribution position is computed by averaging
her or his annual relative contribution positions over the entire earnings
history. In each year, the relative contribution position is expressed as a
multiple of the average annual contribution (roughly speaking, the relative
income position). A ﬁrst element of redistribution was introduced in 1972,
when this multiple could not fall below 75 percent for contributions before
1972, provided a worker had a service life of at least thirty-ﬁve years. A
similar rule was introduced in the 1992 reform: for contributions between
1973 and 1992, multiples below 75 percent are multiplied by 1.5 up to the
maximum of 75 percent, eﬀectively reducing the redistribution for workers
with income positions below 50 percent.
Years of service life are years of active contribution plus years of contri-
bution on behalf of the employee and years that are counted as service years
even when no contribution was made at all. These include, for instance,
years of unemployment, years of military service, three years for each child’s
education for one of the parents, some allowance for advanced education,
and so forth, introducing a second element of redistribution. The oﬃcial
government computations, such as the oﬃcial replacement rate (Renten-
niveau) assume a forty-ﬁve-year contribution history for what is deemed a
normal earnings history (Eckrentner). In fact, the average number of years
of contributions is about thirty-eight years. Unlike the United States, there
is neither an upper bound of years entering the beneﬁt calculation nor can
workers choose certain years in their earnings history and drop others.
Since 1992, the average pension is determined by indexation to the aver-
age net labor income. This solved some of the problems that were created
by indexation to gross wages between 1972 and 1992. Nevertheless, wage
rather than cost of living indexation makes it impossible to ﬁnance the re-
tirement burden by productivity gains.
The average pension has provided a generous beneﬁt level for middle-
income earnings. The net replacement rate for a worker with a forty-ﬁve-
year contribution history is 70.5 percent in 1998. For the average worker
with thirty-eight years of contributions, it is reduced to 59.5 percent. Un-
like the United States, the German pension system has only little redistri-
bution, as is obvious from the beneﬁt computation.8 The low replacement
rates for high incomes results from the upper limit to which earnings are
subject to social security contributions—they correspond to a propor-
tionally lower eﬀective contribution rate.
Before 1992, adjustment of beneﬁts to retirement agewas only implicit via
years of service. Because beneﬁts are proportional to the years of service,
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8. See Casmir (1989) for a comparison.a worker with fewer years of service will get lower beneﬁts. With a constant
income proﬁle and forty years of service, each year of earlier retirement de-
creased pension beneﬁts by 2.5 percent, and vice versa.
The 1992 social security reform changed this by the year 2004. Age 65
will then act as the pivotal age for beneﬁt computations. For each year of
earlier retirement, up to ﬁve years, and if the appropriate conditions in
table 5.1 are met, beneﬁts will be reduced by 3.6 percent (in addition to the
eﬀect of fewer service years). The 1992 reform also introduced rewards for
laterretirement in a systematic way. For each year of retirement postponed
past the minimum age indicated in table 5.1, the pension is increased by 6
percent in addition to the natural increase by the number of service years.
Table 5.2 displays the retirement-age-speciﬁc adjustments for a worker
who has earnings that remain constant after age 60. The table relates the
retirement income for retirement at age 65 (normalized to 100 percent) to
the retirement income for retirement at earlier or later ages, and compares
the implicit adjustments after 1972 with the total adjustments after the
1992 social security reform is fully phased in. As references, the table also
displays the corresponding adjustments in the United States and actuari-
ally fair adjustments at a 3 percent discount rate.9
While neither the German nor the American system were actuarially fair
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9. The actuarially fair adjustments equalize the expected social security wealth for a worker
with an earnings history starting at age S   20. A higher discount rate yields steeper adjust-
ments.
Table 5.2 Adjustment of public pensions by retirement age (pension as a percentage
of the pension that one would obtain if one had retired at age 65)
Germany United States
Age Pre-1992a Post-1992b Pre-1983c Post-1983d Actuarially faire
62 100.0 89.2 80.0 77.8 80,5
63 100.0 92.8 86.7 85.2 86,3
64 100.0 96.4 94.4 92.6 92,8
65 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100,0
66 107.2 106.0 103.0 105.6 108,1
67 114.4 112.0 106.0 111.1 117,2
68 114.4 118.0 109.0 120.0 127,4
69 114.4 124.0 112.0 128.9 139,1
Source: Börsch-Supan and Schnabel (1999).
aGRV 1972–92.
bGRV after 1992 reform has fully phased in.
cU.S. Social Security (OASDHI) until 1983.
dU.S. Social Security after 1983 Social Security Reform has fully phased in.
eEvaluated at a 3% discount rate, 1992–94 mortality risks of West German males and an an-
nual increase in net pensions of 1%.prior to the reforms, the public retirement system in Germany as enacted
in 1972 was particularly distorted. There was less economic incentive for
Americans to retire before age 65 and only a small disincentive to retire
later than at age 65 after the 1983 reform, while the German social security
system tilted the retirement decision heavily toward the earliest applicable
retirement age. The 1992 reform has diminished but not abolished this in-
centive eﬀect.
5.2.5 Disability and Survivor Beneﬁts
The contributions to the German retirement insurance also ﬁnance dis-
ability beneﬁts to workers of all ages and survivor beneﬁts to spouses and
children. In order to be eligible for disability beneﬁts, a worker must pass
one of the two earnings tests mentioned earlier for the old-age disability
pension. If the stricter earnings test is passed, full beneﬁts are paid Er-
werbsunfähigkeitsrente, EU). If only the weaker earnings test is passed and
some earnings capability remains, disability pensions before age 60 are
only two-thirds of the applicable old age pension (Berufsunfähigkeitsrente,
BU). In the 1970s and early 1980s, the German jurisdiction has interpreted
both rules very broadly, in particular the applicability of the ﬁrst rule.
Moreover, jurisdiction also overruled the earnings test (see the following)
for earnings during disability retirement. This lead to a share of EU-type
disability pensions of more than 90 percent of all disability pensions. Be-
cause both rules were used as a device to keep unemployment rates down,
their generous interpretation has only recently led to stricter legislation.10
Survivor pensions are 60 percent of the husband’s applicable pension for
spouses that are age 45 and over or if children are in the household (große
Witwenrente), otherwise 25 percent (kleine Witwenrente). Survivor beneﬁts
are a large component of the public pension budget and of total pension
wealth, as will be shown in section 5.3. Certain earnings tests apply if the
surviving spouse has her or his own income, that is, her or his own pension.
This is only relevant for a very small (below 10 percent) share of widows.
Only since recently are male and female survivors treated equally. As men-
tioned before, the German system does not have a married couple supple-
ment for spouses of beneﬁciaries. However, most wives acquire their own
pension by active and passive contribution (mostly years of advanced ed-
ucation and years of child education).
5.2.6 Preretirement
In addition to beneﬁts through the public pension system, transfer pay-
ments (mainly unemployment compensation) enable what is referred to as
preretirement. Labor-force exit before age 60 is frequent: about 45 percent
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10. See Riphahn (1995) for an analysis of disability rules.of all men call themselves “retired” at age 59. Only about half of them re-
tire because of disability; the other 50 percent make use of one of the many
oﬃcial and unoﬃcial preretirement schemes.
Unemployment compensation has been used as preretirement income in
an oﬃcial scheme that induced very early retirement. Before workers could
enter the public pension system at age 60, they were paid a negotiable com-
bination of unemployment compensation and a supplement or severance
pay. At age 60, a pension of type E (see table 5.1) could start. As the rules
of pensions of type E and the duration of unemployment beneﬁts changed,
so did the unoﬃcial retirement ages. Age 56 was particularly frequent in
West Germany because unemployment compensation is paid up to three
years for elderly workers; it is followed by the lower unemployment aid.
Earlier retirement ages could be induced by paying the worker the diﬀer-
ence between the last salary and unemployment compensation for three
years; and in further years, the diﬀerence between the last salary and un-
employment aid—it all depended on the so-called social plan,which a ﬁrm
would negotiate with the workers before restructuring the workforce.
In addition, early retirement at age 58 was made possible in an oﬃcial
preretirement scheme (Vorruhestand), in which the employer received a
subsidy from the unemployment insurance if a younger employee was
hired. While the ﬁrst (and unoﬃcial) preretirement scheme was very pop-
ular, and a convenient way to bypass the strict German labor laws, few em-
ployers used the oﬃcial second scheme.
5.2.7 Retirement Behavior
The average retirement age in 1998 was 59.7 for men and 60.7 for women.
These numbers refer to West Germany. In the East, retirement age was 57.9
for men and 58.2 for women. The fraction of those who enter retirement
through a disability pension has declined; see ﬁgure 5.2, and was 29 percent
in 1998. Only about 20 percent of all entrants used the normal pathway of
an old-age pension at age 65. The most popular retirement age is 60.
5.2.8 Pension Reform
During and since the estimation sample period, there have been two ma-
jor pension reforms—1992 and 2001—and many smaller adjustments in
between. The main changes in the 1992 reform were to anchor beneﬁts to
net rather than to gross wages. This has implicitly reduced beneﬁts, since
taxes and social security contributions have increased, reducing net rela-
tive to gross wages. This mechanism is particularly important as the popu-
lation’s aging accelerates. The other important changes in 1992 were the in-
troduction of adjustments to beneﬁts in some (not all) cases of early
retirement and a change in the normal retirement age for women. They
have been described in subsection 5.2.4. They will be fully eﬀective in 2009
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tuarially fair, even at very low discount rates.11
The 1999 pension reform, which was supposed to lower the replacement
rate according to a prespeciﬁed so-called demographic factor, was revoked
after a change of government. A side eﬀect of this reform, which was not
revoked, is a gradual change of eligibility ages for pensions for women and
unemployed (types C and E in table 5.1) from age 60 to age 65. This change
will be fully implemented by 2017 and will eﬀectively leave a window of re-
tirement for only those who have at least thirty-ﬁve years of service.
The 2001 reform was a major change in the system. It will change the
monolithic German system of old-age provision to a genuine multipillar
system. Beneﬁts will gradually be reduced by about 10 percent, lowering
the replacement rate with respect to the average net earnings from 72 per-
cent in 1997 to 64 percent in 2030. The eﬀective beneﬁt cuts are even larger,
since the credit of earnings points for education and training will be greatly
restricted. On the other hand, a redeﬁnition of the oﬃcial replacement rate
minimizes the perception of these cuts, because the so-deﬁned new re-
placement rate will be 67 percent with respect to a smaller net earnings
base. The resulting pension gap of slightly less than 20 percent of the cur-
rent retirement income is supposed to be ﬁlled with occupational and indi-
vidual pensions. This new pillar is not mandatory, but the required private
savings will be subsidized or tax privileged. The 2001 reform did not
change the normal retirement age or the adjustment factors with respect to
early retirement age that provide the large incentives to retire early, the
main subject of this project.
5.3 Public Sector Pensions
There are two types of workers in the public sector: civil servants and
other public sector workers. As already mentioned, the latter are part of the
same system as the private sector workers described in the previous section.
In addition, they participate in a supplemental system that resembles oc-
cupational pensions elsewhere and raises the pensions of public sector
workers to the level of civil servants.
Civil servants do not pay explicit contributions for their pensions, as do
the other employees in the private and public sectors.12 Instead, the gross
wage for civil servants is lower than the gross wage of other public sector
employees with a comparable education. Civil servants acquire pension
claims that are very generous compared to workers in the private sector.
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11. Not even at zero.
12. Civil servants are also exempt from unemployment insurance contributions, since civil
servants have a lifetime job guarantee. The government pays a certain percentage of health
expenses of the civil servant and his or her dependents (ranging from 50 to 80 percent). The
rest has to be covered by private insurance.5.3.1 Eligibility: Pathways to Retirement for Civil Servants
There are three pathways for civil servants: the standard, the early, and the
disability retirement option. The standard retirement age is 65. Before July 1,
1997, the early retirement age for civil servants was 62, one year less than the
early retirement age in the social security system. In 1997, the early retire-
ment age was raised to 63. Discount factors for early retirement are phased
in linearly between the years 1998 and 2003, and will reach 0.3 percentage
points per month of early retirement, the same as in the private sector and
substantially smaller than is actuarially fair. Since our sample covers the
years 1984 to 1997, these changes of rules do not play a role in ouranalysis.13
Filing for disability is a third pathway to retirement for civil servants. In
the case of disability, a civil servant receives a pension that is based on his
or her previous salary. The replacement rate depends on the number of ser-
vice years reached before disability retirement and the number of service
years that could potentially have been accumulated, up to age 60. For those
who did not reach the maximum replacement rate before disability, one ad-
ditional year of service raises the replacement rate by only 0.3 percentage
point per year.
5.3.2 Computation of Pensions
The standard pension beneﬁt for civil servants is the product of three
elements: (1) the last gross earnings level, (2) the replacement rate as a
function of service years, and (3) the new adjustment factors to early re-
tirement. As described earlier, this third component does not aﬀect our
sample. There are three crucial diﬀerences between civil servants’ pensions
and private sector beneﬁts. First, the beneﬁt base is gross rather than net
income. In turn, civil servants’ pensions are taxed like any other income.
Finally, the beneﬁt base is the last salary, rather than the lifetime average.
In the following, we concentrate on describing how the system worked
for the sample period 1984–97. Beneﬁts are anchored to the earnings in the
last position and then updated annually by the growth rate of the net earn-
ings of active civil servants. If the last position was reached within the last
two years before retirement, the pension is based on the previous, lower po-
sition. Due to the diﬀerence in the beneﬁt base, gross pensions of civil ser-
vants are approximately 25 percent higher (other things being equal) than
in the private sector.
The maximum replacement rate is 75 percent of gross earnings, which
is considerably higher than the oﬃcial replacement rate of the private sec-
tor system, which is around 70 percent of net earnings. The replacement
rate depends on the years of service. High school and college education,
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13. Very speciﬁc rules apply to some civil servants. For example, the regular retirement age
for police oﬃcers is 60; for soldiers it is even lower, depending on their rank.military service, and other work in the public sector are also counted as ser-
vice years. For retirement after June 1997 the college education credit is
limited to three years.
Before 1992, the replacement rate was a nonlinear function of service
years. The replacement rate started at a value of 35 percent for all civil ser-
vants with at least ﬁve years of service. For each additional year of service
between the 10th and the 25th year the increment was 2 percentage points.
From the 25th to the 35th year the annual increment was 1 percent. Thus,
the maximum replacement rate of 75 percent was reached with thirty-ﬁve
service years under the old rule. This is much more generous than the
private sector replacement rate of 70 percent, which requires forty-ﬁve
years of service.
For persons retiring after January 1, 1992, the replacement rate grows by
1.875 percent points for each year of service. Thus, the maximum value is
reached after forty years of service. However, there are transitional modi-
ﬁcations to that simple rule. First, civil servants who reach the standard
retirement age (usually age 65) before January 1, 2002, are not aﬀected at
all. Second, for younger civil servants, all claims that have been acquired
before 1992 are conserved. These persons gain 1 additional percentage
point per year from 1992 on. All persons who have acquired twenty-ﬁve
service years before 1992 have reached 65 percentage points and would
also have gained only 1 additional point per year under the old rule. Only
persons with less than twenty-ﬁve service years in 1991 can be made worse
oﬀ by the reform. The new proportional rule only applies if it generates a
higher replacement rate than the transitional rule. Our calculations of pen-
sion wealth use these institutional changes, but only a few special cases are
aﬀected.
The generosity of gross pensions received by civil servants vis-à-vis the
private sector workers is only partially oﬀset by the preferential tax treat-
ment of private sector pensions. Since civil servants’ pensions are taxed ac-
cording to the German comprehensive income taxation, the net replace-
ment rates of civil service pension recipients depends on their position in
the highly progressive tax schedule. In general, the net replacement rate
with respect to the preretirement net earnings is higher than 75 percent,
and thus considerably more generous than in the private sector.
5.3.3 Incentives to Retire
In the estimation sample, most civil servants have reached the maximum
replacement rate by the age of 54. Persons who have started to work in the
public sector before the age of 23 have reached a replacement rate of 75
percent when taking into account the disability rules. This also holds for
civil servants, who—like professors—receive lifetime tenure late in their
life cycle. For those groups, the starting age is usually set to 21. Additional
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vant is promoted to a position that has a higher salary. Retirement incen-
tives therefore strongly depend on promotion expectations.
For persons who cannot expect to be promoted after age 54 the pension
accrual is zero or very small. For those who have already reached the re-
placement rate of 75 percent, the accrual of the present discounted pension
wealth is negative. Since the replacement rate is 75 percent of the gross
earnings in the last position before retirement, the negative accrual of post-
poning retirement by one year is simply 75 percent of the last gross earn-
ings. This is equivalent to a 75 percent tax on earnings.
For persons who expect to climb another step in the hierarchy the gross
wage increase is, on average, 10.5 percent. This raises the pension by ap-
proximately 10 percent. In order to cash in the higher pension, the civil ser-
vant has to defer retirement by at least one year.14 In this extreme case, the
social security wealth increases 10 percent through the eﬀect of higher pen-
sions and decreases by 5 percent through the eﬀect of pension deferral. In
this extreme case, the pension accrual is positive. If the civil servant has to
wait several years for the next promotion (or for the promotion to have an
eﬀect on pension claims) the accrual of working becomes negative.
The dependency on promotion expectations makes modeling the incen-
tive eﬀects for civil servants very hard, since the researcher needs infor-
mation on the career prospects of the respondent. We do not have such
information in our data and must therefore ignore the eﬀect of potential
promotions.
5.3.4 Retirement Behavior
The retirement behavior of civil servants reﬂects the German pension
system’s very generous disability and early retirement rules. The average re-
tirement age for civil servants in the year 1993 was 58.9, about one year
lower than in the private sector (see section 5.2.7). Disability is the most
widely used pathway to retirement for civil servants: 40 percent of those
who retired in the year 1993 used disability retirement. Almost one third
used the early retirement option at the age of 62. Only about 20 percent of
civil servants retired at the regular retirement age of 65.
5.4 Data and Base Model
Our microsimulation model is based on a computation of social security
wealth for a large sample of German workers, drawn from the German
Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). It is the same sample that we used in our
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14. For the higher earnings to take eﬀect on pensions it is usually required to work several
years after the promotion.second-stage paper (Börsch-Supan et al. 2003) to estimate the elasticities
of labor supply with respect to the incentives toward early retirement. Our
simulations then focus on a single cohort, namely all males born in 1942
(age 55 in 1997) and their spouses. Additional aggregate information was
taken from data compiled by the German retirement insurance organiza-
tion (Verband deutscher Versicherungträger [VDR]) and the German De-
partment of Labor (Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Sozialordnung
[BMA]). These data include annual statistics on average earnings, pension
system entries and exits, retirement age, and so on (VDR 2002) and system
parameters (BMA 1997). This section describes the data, the construction
of social security wealth, the deﬁnition of incentive variables, and then
brieﬂy discusses the base estimates from our stage-two econometric esti-
mation.
5.4.1 The German Socio-Economic Panel
The German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) is an annual panel study
of some 6,000 households and some 15,000 individuals. The data are gath-
ered by the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW). The GSOEP
is a panel survey of private households. Its design closely corresponds to
the U.S. Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).15 The GSOEP includes
carefully designed household weights that match the data with the German
Mikrozensus. The panel started in 1984. We use 14 annual waves, through
1997.
In 1997, the GSOEP had four subsamples: (1) West German citizens
(9,000 persons in 1984); (2) Foreign workers from Spain, Italy, Greece,
Turkey, and the former Yugoslavia, residing in West Germany (3,000 per-
sons in 1984, oversampled); (3) East German citizens (4,000 persons sam-
pled from 1991 on); and (4) Germans who have remigrated (mainly from
Romania and the former USSR; 1,000 persons sampled in 1995). We draw
our working sample from samples 1 and 2, since the labor supply patterns
of East Germans and remigrants are substantially diﬀerent from resi-
dents in West Germany—such that pooling these samples is not war-
ranted.16
We constructed a both-sided unbalanced panel of all persons aged 55
through 70 from subsamples 1 and 2 for which earnings data are avail-
able.17 This panel includes 2,223 individuals, with 14,401 observations.
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15. Wagner, Burkhauser, and Behringer (1993) provide an English-language description,
code books, and links to an internationally accessible GSOEP version. Börsch-Supan (2000a)
discusses the merits and limits of the GSOEP data for studies of retirement behavior.
16. Schmähl (1991) provides a narrative of the transition.
17. We excluded East Germany because retirement patterns in the East are dominated by
the transition problems to a market economy. See Börsch-Supan and Schmidt (1996) for a
comparison.Average observation time is 6.5 years. The panel is left-censored, as we in-
clude only persons who have worked at least one year during our window
in order to reconstruct an earning history. There is only a slight right cen-
soring due to missing interviews. Speciﬁcally, foreign workers often leave
Germany after retirement. However, since this aﬀects only a few cases, we
did not model this censoring. The sample contains private sector workers,
civil servants and other public sector workers, and self-employed.
The GSOEP data provide a detailed account of income and employment
status. Since the GSOEP performs personal interviews with each member
aged 17 and over in the households, we have the same information on hus-
bands and spouses. The personal information includes labor market status,
gross and net income, hours worked, education, and marital status, but
only a subjective indicator of health (plus disability status and number of
doctor and hospital visits). The GSOEP also has a very detailed labor mar-
ket calendar that provides monthly information on the labor market status
(full time, part time, retired, unemployed, education) and its correspon-
ding income for each sample person. This detailed information is aug-
mented during the sample period by a retrospective history of labor force
participation that starts with age 15. It carries the annual labor market
status (full time, part time, unemployed, out-of-labor force, etc.) but has
no retrospective earnings information. Our second-stage paper (Börsch-
Supan et al. 2002) describes in detail how we reconstruct the earnings his-
tory of each sample person.
Table 5.3 presents the descriptive statistics of the most common socio-
economic variables in our working sample.
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Table 5.3 Descriptive statistics of main variables
Valid Standard
Variable observations Mean deviation Minimum Maximum
Age 14,401 59.77 4.88 53 70
Health 14,401 8.09 3.05 0 10
Married 14,401 86% 34% 0 1
College 14,401 11% 31% 0 1
Skilled 14,401 86% 58% 0 2
Homeown 14,398 52% 50% 0 1
No wealth 14,312 11% 31% 0 1
Financial assets 14,401 22% 42% 0 1
Experience 14,401 450.29 96.01 0 646
Former self-employed 14,401 9% 29% 0 1
Former civil service 14,359 8% 27% 0 1
Children in household 14,401 33% 47% 0 1
Source: GSOEP, working sample of males, 1984–97.5.4.2 Handling of Multiple Retirement Programs
A worker at age 55, at least theoretically has the choice between three re-
tirement programs:
• old-age pensions, starting at age 60
• disability pensions
• preretirement schemes
The set of choices is actually larger, because some of these programs have
several branch programs (within old-age pensions: unemployment, long-
service life, etc.) as was depicted in ﬁgure 5.2. We refer to these choices as
pathways, as we have done in ﬁgure 5.2. It is important to notice that all of
these pathways pay the same beneﬁt, once a person is eligible.18
In practice, there is no free choice, since most of these pathways are sub-
ject to eligibility criteria. Among those, we distinguish between strict eligi-
bility rules that are tied to objective variables such as age, gender, and pre-
vious contribution history, and soft eligibility rules, which are subject to
discretionary decisions, notably the determining of a worker’s disability
status.19
In the construction of social security wealth and the incentive variables
(see the following), we need to compute expected pension beneﬁts, which
depend on the choice of pathway. In the computation of this expected
value, we use the observed frequencies as weights. Let’s suppose that the
observed frequency of disability status at age 59 is 33 percent, and the
sample person is not eligible for any other pathway at that age. Then, ex-
pected beneﬁts at age 59 for this person will be a third of the (common)
beneﬁt level. Börsch-Supan (2001) provides an instrumental variables in-
terpretation of this method and explores the sensitivity with respect to a
more sophisticated choice of instruments.
5.4.3 Construction of Social Security Wealth
A key statistic in our computation of budget impacts is the change in the
net present value of all future beneﬁts when retirement is postponed. In a
slight misuse of terminology, we call the net present value of all future ben-
eﬁts social security wealth (SSW) for both private sector and civil servants’
pensions.
We deﬁne social security wealth as the expected present discounted
value of beneﬁts (YRET) minis applicable contributions that are levied on
gross earnings (c   YLAB). Seen from the perspective of a worker who is S
years old and plans to retire at age R, social security wealth (SSW) is
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18. Strictly speaking, preretirement programs can have any beneﬁt level, because they are
negotiated between workers and employers. In practice, however, the outcome of these nego-
tiations is guided by public insurance beneﬁts.
19. Disability depends on health as well as labor market characteristics.SSW S(R)  ∑
 
t R
YRET t(R)   at    t S  ∑
R 1
t S
c   YLABt   at    t S,
with
SSW net present discounted value of retirement beneﬁts
S planning age
R retirement age
YLABt gross labor income at age t
YRETt(R) net pension income at age t for retirement at age R
ct contribution rate to pension system at age t
at probability to survive at least until age t, given survival until
age S
  discount factor   1/(1   r).
We choose the usual discount rate of 3 percent. Conditional survival
probabilities are computed from the standard life tables of the German Bu-
reau of the Census (Statistisches Bundesamt). SSW depends also on the
joint survival probabilities of spouses through survivor pensions. We as-
sume independence of survival of spouses to compute the joint probability.
5.4.4 Speciﬁcation of Incentive Variables
The behavioral eﬀect, which represents the labor supply response to the
simulated reform plans as explained in the introduction, is determined by
the elasticity of labor supply with respect to the incentives in the pension
system. We use two diﬀerent forward-looking incentive measures:
• PEAKVAL: the maximum of future SSW over all possible retirement
ages minus the SSW for immediate retirement
• OPTVAL: the option value of postponing retirement by 1 year.
The peak value suggested by Coile and Gruber (2000) takes the diﬀer-
ence between SSW today and SSW in the year in which the expected value
of SSW is maximized:
PEAKVALS(R)   SSW S(R)   maxT R[SSW S(T)]
This measure therefore captures the tradeoﬀ between retiring today and
working until a year with a much higher SSW. In years beyond the year in
which SSW peaks, this calculation collapses to a simple one-year accrual
variable.
The peak value captures only the ﬁnancial aspects of the retirement de-
cision. Alternatively, one might consider the consumption utility of net
earnings and pension beneﬁts and also account for the utility aspects of the
labor-leisure tradeoﬀ. To this end, we employ as a second incentive variable
the option value to postpone retirement (Stock and Wise 1990; Börsch-
Supan 2000b). This value expresses for each retirement age the trade-oﬀ
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retirement age) and keeping all options open for some later retirement date
(with associated streams of utility for all possible later retirement ages).
Let V t(R) denote the expected discounted future utility at age t if the
worker retires at age R, speciﬁed as follows:




NET)   as    s t   ∑
 
s R
u[YRETs(R)]   as    s t,
with
YLABs
NET after-tax labor income at age s, s   t ...   R – 1
YRETs(R) pension income at age s, s   R
R retirement age
  marginal utility of leisure, to be estimated
a probability to survive at least until age s
  discount factor   1/(1   r).
Utility from consumption is represented by an isoelastic utility function
in after-tax income, u(Y)   Y . Remember that pension income in Ger-
many is eﬀectively untaxed. To capture utility from leisure, utility during
retirement is weighted by   1, where 1/  is the marginal disutility of
work.
The option value for a speciﬁc age is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between
the maximum attainable consumption utility if the worker postpones
retirement to some later year minus the utility of consumption that the
worker can aﬀord if the worker would retire now. Let R∗(t) denote the op-
timal retirement age if the worker postpones retirement past age t, that is,
max[V t(r)] for r   t. With this notation, the option value is
G(t)   V t[R∗(t)]   V t(t).
The option value captures the economic incentives created by the pen-
sion system and the labor market, because the retirement income
YRET s(R) depends on retirement age, according to the adjustment factors
and on previous labor income by the beneﬁt rules summarized in sections
5.2 and 5.3.
We compute the peak and option values for every person in our sample,
using the applicable pension regulations and the imputed earning histo-
ries. The parameters chosen are a discount rate   of 3 percent, a curvature
parameter  of 1.0, and a relative utility parameter  of 2.8; see our second-
stage paper.
5.4.5 Base Model Estimates
The behavioral eﬀect is based on the probit estimates obtained in the sec-
ond stage of this project. See Börsch-Supan et al. (2002) for a detailed dis-
cussion. The probit estimations regressed old-age labor force status on one
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scribed, and a set of other explanatory variables: an array of socioeco-
nomic variables such as age, gender, marital status, wealth (indicator vari-
ables of several ﬁnancial and real wealth categories), and a self-assessed
health measure ranging from 0 for poor to 10 for excellent health.
Table 5.4 summarizes the base estimation results from 24 diﬀerent mod-
els.20 We use two diﬀerent incentive variables (option value and peak
value). For each of these incentive variables, we run probit regressions with
three age speciﬁcations (linear, quadratic, and a full set of age dummies)
and with and without including social security wealth. We pool public and
private workers, but have separate regressions for males and females.
All incentive variables have the correct sign and are highly signiﬁcant.
They are very robust across all the diﬀerent speciﬁcations, including inclu-
sion of other covariates, sample selection, and deﬁnition of retirement (not
shown in table 5.4). Including age dummies yields larger marginal eﬀects and
better precision, while including SSW has a very small weakening eﬀect.
Among the other covariates, self-reported health is highly signiﬁcant:
healthier workers retire substantially later than those who report poor
health. The eﬀect of a college degree on retirement age is also very strong—
independent of wealth and income eﬀects. The wealth variables are barely
signiﬁcant: persons with higher wealth (homeownership, ﬁnancial assets)
aﬀord an earlier retirement. Also, higher labor income weakens labor force
attachment. The self-employed tend to work longer, while civil servants re-
tire earlier.
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20. The estimates diﬀer slightly from those in Börsch-Supan et al. (2002) due to various
changes in the common deﬁnitions’ template.
Table 5.4 Marginal eﬀect of incentive variables
Option value: Age Peak value: Age
Linear Quadratic Dummies Linear Quadratic Dummies
Males
Without SSW –0.00023237 –0.0020934 –0.0024276 –0.0012644 –0.00107072 –0.00292954
(–5, 5) (–5, 0) (–5, 5) (–3, 8) (–3, 2) (–5, 7)
With SSW –0.00030332 –0.00027806 –0.0003286 –0.00126031 –0.00105993 –0.00293449
(–6, 1) (–5, 6) (–6, 2) (–3, 7) (–3, 2) (–5, 7)
Females
Without SSW –0.00005129 –0.00006159 –0.00010106 –0.00133364 –0.00159996 –0.00270272
(–3, 4) (–3, 1) (–3, 1) (–5, 1) (–5, 0) (–4, 2)
With SSW –0.00005499 –0.00006957 –0.00013015 –0.00155703 –0.00189241 –0.00384073
(–3, 7) (–3, 4) (–3, 7) (–5, 2) (–5, 1) (–4, 6)
Source: GSOEP, working sample, 1984–97.
Note: ∂P/∂x and t-statistics (in parentheses).5.5 Simulation Results
We now apply these estimated coeﬃcients to simulate the budget eﬀects
of pension reforms. We ﬁrst describe the design of the simulations. Second,
we sketch the behavioral responses to the reforms, namely the changes in
retirement age. Third, we present the budget eﬀects, both in summary and
disaggregated by age, by behavioral and mechanical eﬀects, and by bene-
ﬁts and taxes/contributions. We end this section by discussing distribu-
tional issues.
5.5.1 Design of Simulations
All simulations are based on the 1942 cohort of preretirement workers
(age 55 in 1997). We include (a) all male workers and their spouses (if any)
and (b) all single female workers of this cohort.
Since this leaves us with a rather small sample, we augment this original
cohort by thirteen additional cohorts, born between 1929 and 1941, by syn-
thetically de-aging them to the more youthful 1942 cohort. This is done by
assigning the persons in the earlier cohorts the earnings history and other
characteristics (including age) they would have had at age 55. This proce-
dure is possible because we have constructed complete earnings histories.
Based on this synthetic cohort, we ﬁrst estimate the probability that each
worker will exit the labor force via death or retirement at each future age
and the net present discounted value of retirement program contributions
and beneﬁts associated with each type of labor force exit. The resulting
weighted average social security wealth is our base for comparison. We
then reestimate the exit probabilities, contributions, and beneﬁts under
several reforms in order to obtain new social security wealth estimates. Our
key result is the percentage change in social security wealth, including and
excluding a behavioral response to the reform, as the diﬀerence between
these numbers measures the extent to which labor supply responses am-
plify the eﬀect of reforms on program solvency.
We use three hypothetical reform scenarios (Three-Year Reform, Actu-
arial Reform, and Common Reform, explained in more detail later) and
apply them systematically to several variants of our estimated models of re-
tirement. These variants include the option value and the peak value
model, each of which is estimated using a linear and a dummy-variable age
speciﬁcation. In the latter case and in combination with the Three-Year
Reform, we introduce yet another two variants: keeping the dummy vari-
ables at their original ages (ﬁxed dummies speciﬁcation), or shifting them
along with the shift in the incentive variables (shifted dummies speciﬁca-
tion). These latter variants are designed to bracket possible behavioral
eﬀects that are embedded in the age dummies; in particular, habitual eﬀects
associated with age 65 as a psychological anchor for retirement decisions.
222 Axel Börsch-Supan, Simone Kohnz, and Reinhold SchnabelThe Three-Year Reform increases the age of early and normal retire-
ment by three years relative to the status quo; it also shifts the correspon-
ding adjustment factors, if applicable. The Actuarial Reform introduces a
6 percent per year actuarial adjustment, pivoted at age 65, roughly dou-
bling the value that was legislated by the 1992 reform in Germany. The
Common Reform changes all national systems to a common system with
an early retirement age of 60 years, a normal retirement age of 65 years, a
60 percent replacement rate at age 65, and a 6 percent per year actuarial
adjustment, pivoted at age 65. For Germany, this adds a reduction in the
replacement rate of some 10 percentage points to the eﬀect of the Actuar-
ial Reform.
Even without a behavioral reaction, that is, without a response in labor
supply, these reforms have an automatic eﬀect on ﬁscal contributions by
changing contributions and beneﬁts for a given work history. We call this
the mechanical eﬀect of a reform. For instance, a shift in the early retire-
ment eligibility age from age 60 to age 61 will leave those who retire at age
60 without beneﬁts for a year, substantially reducing pension beneﬁts.
Labor supply, however, is likely to respond to the shift in the early retire-
ment age. This is the behavioral eﬀect. Following up on our example, most
of these early retirees will now work one additional year, adding the payroll
contributions to the budget of the public pension system. The ﬁscal impact
of this behavioral eﬀect depends on two factors: ﬁrst, on the strength of the
labor force response as estimated in the previous section, and second, on
the ﬁscal implications of the shift in retirement patterns. If a pension sys-
tem is actuarially fair, a change in the average retirement age will not have
any ﬁscal eﬀect, provided that the discount rate used to deﬁne actuarial
fairness equals the discount rate used to compute ﬁscal implications.21
There is actually a third eﬀect, namely, the macroeconomic feedback
eﬀect of these reforms on the level of taxes and contributions. For instance,
if a reform implies lower beneﬁts, the government might lower the contri-
bution rate to the pay-as-you-go budget. We do not model such feedback
eﬀects; our simulations are in this sense static simulations that exclude dy-
namic budget eﬀects.
We simulate both the mechanical and the behavioral eﬀect, using the
econometric retirement models from the second stage to predict labor
supply responses. The result is an estimate of the steady-state impact of the
reforms on the ﬁnancial balance sheet of the German public pension system.
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21. We assume the same discount rate of 3 percent to deﬁne actuarial fairness and to com-
pute intertemporal budget eﬀects. One might argue that one should use a higher discount rate
for actuarial fairness, reﬂecting the real rate of return on the capital market, and a lower dis-
count rate for budget calculations, reﬂecting the low implicit rate of return of the pay-as-you-
go system (Schnabel 1998, 1999).5.5.2 Behavioral Eﬀects and Their Fiscal Implications
We begin with the behavioral eﬀect, then describe its implications on the
budget, and ﬁnally add the mechanical eﬀect to obtain the total budget im-
pact. We ﬁrst summarize the behavioral eﬀects of the hypothetical pension
reforms on old-age labor supply as a change in the mean retirement age
(see table 5.5) and then present detailed results in a set of graphs.22
The Three-Year Reform has little eﬀect in the linear age and dummies-
ﬁxed speciﬁcations, and actually changes it insigniﬁcantly in the wrong
direction. This may come as a surprise, but it is easy to explain. Since we
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Table 5.5 Expected retirement age
Model Men Women
Sample
Sample frequencies 61.87 61.76
Base simulation
Option value model, linear age 62.00 62.01
Option value model, dummies 61.87 61.79
Peak value model, linear age 62.00 62.01
Peak value model, dummies 61.88 61.79
Three-Year Reform
Option value model, linear age 61.37 61.91
Option value model, dummies ﬁxed 61.14 61.63
Option value model, dummies shifted 64.37 64.28
Peak value model, linear age 61.91 61.93
Peak value model, dummies ﬁxed 61.75 61.68
Peak value model, dummies shifted 64.63 64.54
Actuarial Reform
Option value model, linear age 65.28 63.86
Option value model, dummies ﬁxed 64.92 63.92
Option value model, dummies shifted 64.96 64.14
Peak value model, linear age 63.53 64.08
Peak value model, dummies ﬁxed 64.38 63.81
Peak value model, dummies shifted 64.34 64.01
Common Reform
Option value model, linear age 65.42 62.77
Option value model, dummies ﬁxed 65.02 62.69
Option value model, dummies changed 65.04 62.93
Peak value model, linear age 63.19 62.82
Peak value model, dummies ﬁxed 64.05 62.71
Peak value model, dummies changed 63.97 62.93
Note: Expected value is taken over distribution truncated at age 72.
22. Figures diﬀer from Börsch-Supan et al. (2003), since they refer to diﬀerent reform im-
plementations.model the Germany disability insurance as a perfect substitute for old-age
pensions, there is no eﬀective early retirement age. Since there are no ac-
tuarial adjustments, shifting the normal retirement age has no economic
implications as well (although there may be a psychological eﬀect—this
is modeled in the shifted-dummy speciﬁcation following). The only diﬀer-
ence of the Three-Year Reform is a shift of the bonus for retiring at age
66 or 67 to 69 and 70—but since most people have retired long before
these ages, the reform undoes the minor incentive at the ages 66 and 67,
and therefore shifts the average retirement age slightly forward. If we as-
sume in the shifted-dummies speciﬁcation, however, that the entire retire-
ment behavior shifts by three years for psychological reasons related to the
signaling eﬀect of the normal retirement age, we more or less tautologically
see such change.
In contrast, the other two reform policies shift the retirement age quite
substantially, by between two and four years. Considering the overall
length of retirement in Germany, which is currently about 18 years, the or-
ders of magnitude are quite signiﬁcant.
Figure 5.3 gives a more detailed description of the behavioral eﬀect by
looking on the impact of reforms by age of labor force exit. The ﬁgure has
eighteen panels, corresponding to the eighteen simulation results in table
5.5. For each of the three reforms, we present six simulation variants. These
variants include the option value and the peak value model, each of which
is estimated using a linear and a dummy-variable age speciﬁcation (see
table 5.4). We split the latter speciﬁcation in two treatments of the set of
dummy variables, indicating age when we simulate the reform impact: (a)
keeping the dummy variables at their original ages, and (b) shifting them
along with the shift in the incentive variables. These two treatments are de-
signed to bracket possible behavioral eﬀects that are embedded in the age
dummies; in particular, habitual eﬀects, associated with age 65 as a psy-
chological anchor for retirement decisions. Treatment (a) assumes that this
anchor stays constant in spite of the three-year shift in retirement age in
our ﬁrst reform option, and the actuarial adjustment in the second reform
option. Treatment (b) shifts the anchor according to the shift in the so-
called normal retirement age.
We begin with ﬁgure 5.3, panel A. The linear age model does not capture
the spikes typical for retirement behavior. They are clearly visible in the
second and third panel, where dummy variables describe the eﬀect of age
on retirement. As previously described, the Three-Year Reform does not
matter much in the German system unless the entire set of dummies is
shifted by three years as well, modeling a shift in the perceived normal re-
tirement by three years—see the third panel. In this case, not surprisingly,
the spikes shift about three years later.
Panels B and C of ﬁgure 5.3 show the behavioral eﬀects of the Actuarial
The Budget Impact of Reduced Early Retirement Incentives in Germany 225Fig. 5.3 Distribution of retirement rates: A, Three-Year Reform, option value; B,
Actuarial Reform, option value; C, Common Reform, option value; D, Three-Year
Reform, peak value; E, Distribution of retirement rates: Actuarial Reform, peak
value; F, Common Reform, peak value
AFig. 5.3 (cont.)
BFig. 5.3 (cont.) Distribution of retirement rates: A, Three-Year Reform, option
value; B, Actuarial Reform, option value; C, Common Reform, option value; D,
Three-Year Reform, peak value; E, Distribution of retirement rates: Actuarial
Reform, peak value; F, Common Reform, peak value
CFig. 5.3 (cont.)
DFig. 5.3 (cont.) Distribution of retirement rates: A, Three-Year Reform, option
value; B, Actuarial Reform, option value; C, Common Reform, option value; D,
Three-Year Reform, peak value; E, Distribution of retirement rates: Actuarial
Reform, peak value; F, Common Reform, peak value
EFig. 5.3 (cont.)
FReform and the Common Reform, which are quite similar. Modal retire-
ment age increases by four years in the linear speciﬁcations and by about
two years in the dummy-variable speciﬁcations. Note that early retirement
before age 63 is greatly reduced due to the actuarial adjustment.
Figure 3, panels D–F repeat the exercise, using the peak value estimates
rather than the option value estimates. The estimated behavioral eﬀects are
qualitatively similar but somewhat smaller than in the option value model.
5.5.3 Budget Eﬀects
Together with the mechanical eﬀects of the reforms, the changing retire-
ment patterns have substantial budget eﬀects. Table 5.6 shows how they
emerge.
The Three-Year Reform eliminates the incentives to retire at age 66 and
67, thereby very slightly reducing beneﬁts (except panel B). Through the in-
duced earlier retirement age, work-related taxes and contributions also de-
crease by about 8 percent according to the option value model, and between
1 and 2 percent in the peak value model. If we enforce a shift in the entire
retirement distribution (panels C and F) in the shifted-dummies speciﬁca-
tion, beneﬁts decrease a bit more, but the main budget eﬀect is created by a
substantial increase in taxes and contributions of about 25 percent.
The Actuarial Reform and the Common Reform postpone retirement by
two to four years. This reduces beneﬁts and increases taxes and contribu-
tions in a similar fashion as the Three-Year Reform in the dummies-shifted
speciﬁcation (beneﬁts by some 10 percent, taxes and contribution by some
30 percent). While the behavioral eﬀects are similar for the Actuarial Re-
form and the Common Reform (see ﬁgure 5.3), the additional mechanical
eﬀect of reducing the replacement rate in the Common Reform reduces
beneﬁts quite dramatically, by more than 30 percent.
Table 5.7 decomposes the budget eﬀect into mechanical and behavioral
eﬀects. Note that the denominator of the percentage change in the last row
of each panel is now the baseline PDV of beneﬁts. The introduction of a 6
percent per year actuarial adjustment in the Actuarial Reform implies a re-
duction of pension expenditures for our 1942 cohort by 18 percent in di-
rect beneﬁt reductions and by an additional 26 percent through labor
supply responses. The introduction of the hypothetical common pension
system, used as a yardstick in all country chapters of this volume, which
features an early retirement age of 60 years, a normal retirement age of 65
years, a 60 percent replacement rate at age 65, and a 6 percent per year ac-
tuarial adjustment, pivoted at age 65, will reduce pension expenditures by
37 percent directly and by about 26 percent through labor supply re-
sponses, relative to the pre-1992 system in Germany. This system has a
steeper actuarial adjustment and a deeper pension cut than introduced by
the actual 1992 and 2001 reforms.
Figure 5.4 converts these percent changes relative to baseline beneﬁts


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4Fig. 5.4 Behavioral, mechanical, and total budget impact of pension reform: A,
Gross Beneﬁts; B, Beneﬁts net of taxes and contributions
AFig. 5.4 (cont.) Behavioral, mechanical, and total budget impact of pension re-
form: A, Gross Beneﬁts; B, Beneﬁts net of taxes and contributions
Binto percent of GDP. Panel A of ﬁgure 5.4 only looks at changes in pension
beneﬁts, while panel B adds changes in taxes and contributions. The largest
eﬀect occurs, as we have seen, in the common form, which combines a re-
placement rate cut with a later retirement age and saves pension expendi-
tures of up to 2 percent of GDP.
Finally, we disaggregate the total eﬀect by age of entry into retirement.
This is shown in ﬁgures 5.5 and 5.6. Figure 5.5 shows the total eﬀect, while
ﬁgure 5.6 looks only at beneﬁts. Note that the amount of taxes and contri-
butions collected for a given age of retirement remains unchanged, due to
the static deﬁnition of our hypothetical reforms. Of course, the total
amount of taxes and contributions changes considerably under the re-
forms, because the weight for each retirement age is changed. All ﬁgures re-
late to the option value estimation with linear age dummies.
Figures 5.5 and 5.6 show that the Three-Year Reform has very little im-
pact, and only on retirement around age 67 and 68, due to the somewhat
awkward jump in the replacement rate at ages 66 and 67, which is shifted
by the reform to ages 69 and 70. Note the scale: the eﬀects are relatively
small.
The Actuarial Reform and the Common Reform have a clear-cut pat-
tern: negative eﬀects for early retirement (before age 65), and positive
eﬀects for late retirement. Since the latter are smaller in the aggregate than
the former, the overall eﬀect is a reduction in the budget, as we have seen
earlier.
5.5.4 Distributional Considerations
Tables 5.8 and 5.9 show the ﬁnancial implications of the reforms by
quintiles of lifetime earnings. Lifetime earnings are deﬁned on a family ba-
sis and incorporate the forty highest income years of both spouses. We
chose cutoﬀ points for married and single persons separately such that the
lowest quintile, for example, contains 20 percent of the poorest couples
and 20 percent of the poorest singles. The ﬁgures shown correspond to the
1942 cohort.
The ﬁrst column of each table displays the net present value of beneﬁts,
contributions, and taxes paid by the ith quintile. The lowest earnings group
makes up approximately 7.5 percent of the entire net PDV, while the high-
est earnings group covers around 33.5 to 34 percent.
The second column reports the percentage changes in the net PDV of the
social security wealth (SSW) by quintile: (Σi∈quintileSSW i(R) – Σi∈quintile
SSW i(BC))/Σi∈quintileSSW i(BC) where R stands for reform and BC for base
case.
In all three reforms, the percentage change from the base case is negative
for all quintiles, except for the Three-Year Reform in the constant dum-
mies speciﬁcation, where the reform, as we have emphasized earlier, is
essentially ineﬀective. In every quintile, pension expenditure decreases.
The Budget Impact of Reduced Early Retirement Incentives in Germany 239Fig. 5.5 Fiscal impact of total eﬀects: A, Three-Year Reform, option value; B, Ac-
tuarial Reform, option value; C, Common Reform, option value; D, Three-Year Re-




DFig. 5.5 (cont.) Fiscal impact of total eﬀects: A, Three-Year Reform, option value;
B, Actuarial Reform, option value; C, Common Reform, option value; D, Three-
Year Reform, peak value; E, Actuarial Reform, peak value; F, Common Reform,
peak value.
E
FFig. 5.6 Present discounted value of social security wealth beneﬁts: A, Three-Year
Reform, option value; B, Actuarial Reform, option value; C, Common Reform, op-
tion value; D, Three-Year Reform, peak value; E, Actuarial Reform, peak value; F,
Common Reform, peak value
A
BFig. 5.6 (cont.) Present discounted value of social security wealth beneﬁts: A,
Three-Year Reform, option value; B, Actuarial Reform, option value; C, Common
Reform, option value; D, Three-Year Reform, peak value; E, Actuarial Reform,





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































7Moreover, the absolute magnitude of the change increases with increasing
quintiles.
5.6 Conclusions
This chapter shows that the very large public pension budget in Ger-
many can be reduced signiﬁcantly by neutralizing its strong incentives to
retire early. Our simulations show a large response of old-age labor force
participation to two reforms, the introduction of an actuarial adjustment
(Actuarial Reform) and the introduction of a system with an early retire-
ment age of 60 years, a normal retirement age of 65 years, a 60 percent re-
placement rate at age 65, and a 6 percent per year actuarial adjustment,
pivoted at age 65 (Common Reform). These reforms combine elements of
the actual 1992 and 2001 reforms in Germany. However, both hypothetical
reforms have steeper actuarial adjustments than introduced by the actual
1992 reform, and the Common Reform has a deeper pension cut than in-
troduced by 2001 reform.
Mean retirement age will increase by between two and four years in both
reform scenarios. And since the German system is far from actuarially fair,
these labor supply responses translate into large ﬁscal eﬀects. These eﬀects
are augmented by the mechanical eﬀects when the eligibility age for pen-
sion beneﬁts is changed.
The introduction of a 6 percent per year actuarial adjustment implies a
reduction of pension expenditures for a typical cohort born in 1942 (and
thus still mainly governed by the pre-1992 pension rules) by 18 percent in
direct beneﬁt reductions and by an additional 26 percent through labor-
supply responses. The introduction of the hypothetical common pension
system, used as a yardstick in all country chapters of this volume, which
features an early retirement age of 60 years, a normal retirement age of 65
years, a 60 percent replacement rate at age 65, and a 6 percent per year ac-
tuarial adjustment, pivoted at age 65, will reduce pension expenditures by
37 percent directly and by about 26 percent through labor-supply re-
sponses, relative to the pre-1992 system in Germany.
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